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The Open and the Suspension of Being: A Review Article of New Work by Agamben, Hel-
ler-Roazen, and Smock 
 
In his book L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale (2002; The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell, 
2004), Giorgio Agamben formulates a singularly fascinating yet conceptually complex theory, pre-
figuring what might be a new meaning and usage of ontology. In brief, Agamben explores the 
philosophical possibility of an ontology without Being or, rather, of an ontology where the defini-
tion of Being arrived at through differentiating between forms of beings (i.e., humans/animals) is 
suspended. The philosophical suspension we are referring to is brought about by a redefinition of 
the open (the world) as the locus of a blissful ignorance (la grande ignoranza), resulting from a 
process that disables the historical and cultural determinants of being through an access of 
memory. Hence the gradual indistinguishableness of humans and animals that takes place in the 
space of the open. An entry point into Agamben's thought might be gained by contrasting the con-
cept of the open as elaborated in Heidegger's original interpretation of the pre-Socratic notion of 
aletheia with the poetic narration of the open in Rilke's eighth Duino Elegy. This is not to say that 
Heidegger and Rilke are Agamben's only references, far from it. As a matter of fact, in L'aperto 
Rilke is mentioned only briefly to clarify Heidegger's thinking. And yet this comparison -- and clari-
fication -- takes place in one of the most significant chapters of L'aperto titled, emblematically, 
"l'aperto." At the beginning of the chapter we read: "More than ten years later [more than ten 
years after Heidegger's Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik], in full world war, Heidegger returns to 
this concept [the open. The series of seminars Agamben refers to were later collected in the vol-
ume Parmenides] and traces a summary genealogy of it. That it arose out of the eighth Duino Ele-
gy was, in a certain sense, obvious; but in being adopted as the name of being ('the open, in 
which every being is freed ... is being itself'), Rilke's term undergoes an essential reversal, which 
Heidegger seeks to emphasize in every way. For in the eighth Elegy it is the animal (die Kreatur) 
that sees the open 'with all its eyes,' in distinct contrast to man, whose eyes have instead been 
'turned backward' and placed 'like traps' around him. While man always has the world before him -
- always only stands 'facing opposite' (gegenüber) and never enters the 'pure space' of the outside 
-- the animal instead moves in the open, in a 'nowhere without the no'" (57) ("Più di dieci anni 
dopo, in piena Guerra mondiale, Heidegger torna su questo concetto e ne traccia una sommaria 
genealogia. Che esso provenisse dall'ottava Elegia duinese era, in un certo senso, scontato; ma, 
nella sua assunzione come nome dell'essere ('l'aperto in cui ogni ente è liberato ... è l'essere 
stesso'), il termine rilkiano subisce un essenziale rovesciamento, che Heidegger cerca in ogni modo 
di sottolineare. Nell'ottava Elegia, infatti a vedere l'aperto 'con tutti gli occhi' è l'animale (die 
Kreatur), opposto decisamente all'uomo, i cui occhi sono stati invece 'rivoltati' e posti 'come 
trappole' intorno ad esso. Mentre l'uomo ha sempre davanti a sé il mondo, sta sempre e soltanto 
'di fronte' (gegenüber) e non accede mai al 'puro spazio' del fuori, l'animale si muove invece 
nell'aperto, in un 'da nessuna parte senza non'" [60]). 
The stark differences between Rilke's poetization of the open on the one hand, and Heidegger's 
conceptualization of it on the other, are not only useful to make sense of Heidegger's philosophy 
but also, and more pointedly, to dig deeper into Agamben's own refinement of Heidegger's 
thought. Agamben states clearly that Heidegger found and took the notion of the open in and from 
Rilke's eighth Elegy ("That it arose out of the eighth Duino Elegy was, in a certain sense, obvious 
"). And yet this seems to be the only commonality since Rilke's and Heidegger's reading are dia-
metrically opposed (Heidegger calls this opposition "a gaping abyss" ["eine Kluft" 1992, 159]). 
Whereas in Rilke the animal sees the open ("Mit allen Augen sieht die Kreatur/das Offene" 1942, 
76) -- is in the open -- in Heidegger the animal is unaware of it, and therefore shut out from the 
open. Both Rilke and Heidegger preserve the paradigmatic distinction opposing humans and ani-
mals, but while Rilke does it through romantically anthropomorphizing the animal (Heidegger calls 
it the "hominization of the animal" [Parmenides 161]), Heidegger does it by further emphasizing 
and insisting on the differences. Heidegger's conceptualization of the open is arrived at through an 
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original rendition of the pre-Socratic notion of aletheia (which might be translated as "truth," "un-
covering" but also, although more metaphorically, as the "fight against oblivion"). Heidegger 
thinks of aletheia as unconcealment, as the freedom "to-be-there." Humans' freedom, their break-
ing from the concealed closure in which all creatures are housed is, according to Heidegger, 
achieved through language. Following in the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger traces the 
gap separating humans from animals back to language. It is the human's ability to speak, and 
therefore to enter a dialogue with tradition, that enables beings to come face-to-face with the 
open and, ultimately with Being. It is this very ability that perhaps has convinced branches of oth-
er schools of thought (i.e., natural science, positivism) to interpret the conscious and rational ma-
nipulation of the open as a historical and cultural human right. It is in this sense that the spiritual 
backlash, an example of which is Rilke's eighth Elegy, might be interpreted as a reaction to the 
arrogance of humans who have turned a gift into a banishment. The painful detachment and exile 
of humans from the open, so powerfully evoked by Rilke, can be read, then, as a separation en-
forced and brought about by people themselves. Thus, Rilke's "taking leave" ("Abschied nehmen" 
80) from the open is not so much a natural condition as a cultural and historical self-inflicted pun-
ishment. The systematic critique that Heidegger mounts against both modern metaphysics and 
positivism, and that Agamben inherits in L'aperto, is that of having mistaken being for Being and, 
as a result of this, of treating the subject (being) as always already confronting a separate and 
distinct object (the open). This, according to Heidegger, is the great shortcoming of Western met-
aphysics the final results of which are Nietzsche's philosophy and Rilke's poetry (Heidegger also 
refers to modern metaphysics as "popular biological metaphysics" [Parmenides 158]). And yet this 
is precisely the moment at which Heidegger's philosophical project comes to an end. In fact, while 
it is clear that for Heidegger Western metaphysics has exhausted its purpose, the reasons for met-
aphysics' decline are not totally clear. More importantly, while Heidegger's theorization of aletheia 
as unconcealment, as that which exposes the open ("aletheia is the looking of Being into the open 
that is lighted by it itself as it itself, the open for the uncocealedness of all appearance ["offen für 
das Unverborgene alles Erscheinens" 162]) finds fruitful outcome in Heidegger's analysis of art and 
poetry -- especially in Holzwege and Unterwegs zur Sprache -- its ethical and moral significance 
remain unthought. 
In a book that precedes L'aperto by about twenty-five years, Infanzia e storia (1978; rept. 
2001; Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, 1993), Agamben developed a theory 
which might help to place the belief in the erosion of metaphysics, shared by many modern and 
contemporary philosophers and thinkers, into context. Agamben spoke of the typically modern 
phenomenon of the destruction of experience which is also to be ascribed, as he argued in that 
book, to the modern inability to tell, hand down, stories. Modernity is the age when experience 
and tradition, in their conventional understanding, collapsed for a lack of narrative. Now, if lan-
guage is that which places being opposite the open, metaphysically turning being into the subject 
of inquiry, the lack of language is also the moment when this confrontation terminates. With the 
collapse of language as the instrument of communication and the vehicle through which 
knowledge, and therefore experience and tradition are transferred, the very basis of Western met-
aphysics, that is the presence of the subject, is under threat. Clearly, Agamben did not state that 
modern humans had lost the ability to speak, write, and tell stories. On the contrary, they went on 
to write and tell, and yet this writing and telling were now predicated not so much on a construc-
tion of experience as on the destruction of experience. This paradigmatic shift from construction to 
destruction announces the end of metaphysics and the beginning of a historical and cultural period 
that is still in the making. Agamben's notion of this destruction is once again a refinement of 
Heidegger's thought. In fact, in Was ist das – die Philosophie? (1956) Heidegger speaks of de-
struction in ways and terms that leave no doubt about the importance and the impact that they 
will have for Agamben. On page 71 of the bilingual edition of What is Philosophy? we read: "De-
struction does not mean destroying but dismantling, demolishing, putting to one side the merely 
historical assertions about the history of philosophy. Destruction means -- to open our ears, to 
make ourselves free for what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being" (71-73). This is a 
crucial passage not only because it emphasizes the internal coherence of Heidegger's thought, but 
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also because it sheds more light on Heidegger's understanding of aletheia, open and 
unconcealment. The key element pertaining to Heidegger's conceptualization of aletheia, that is 
the freedom to unconceal being in the open, is brought about by destruction. Paradoxically, and 
with one of those very typical Heideggerian linguistic summersaults, Heidegger says that destruc-
tion does not equate with destruction but with dismantling, demolishing. By dismantling and de-
molishing Heidegger means a philosophical availability, that is, a frame of mind that will allow a 
free engagement with the past (tradition, experience). This availability will demolish the con-
straints that the past has conventionally placed on the present. It is by accepting this new way of 
hearing, and therefore speaking, that modernity makes Heidegger's project its own. And it is in 
this sense that Agamben can interpret the language of modernity not as a lesser language. Con-
versely, he sees the destruction of experience carried out in modernity as the necessary and indis-
pensable shift which decrees at once the end of metaphysics and the beginning of a new ontology 
and a new philosophy: the coming philosophy.  
Again, destruction does not mean unlearning, forgetting how to speak, and unlearning and 
forgetting how to be human in order to start from scratch (as in more nihilistic modern experimen-
tations, including Nietzsche's philosophy, futurism, and dadaism). It means, rather, to learn how 
to be really human, and to remember better, more profoundly. And yet this remembering better 
must perforce pass from a form of oblivion, which is, ultimately, the questioning of what Agamben 
in L'aperto calls the anthropological machine constructed by Western metaphysics. It is perhaps 
here, at this important juncture revolving around oblivion and remembering that one might at-
tempt to interpret Heidegger's rendition of aletheia, and its implied meaning as the fight against 
oblivion, as part of a broader philosophical project. In order to unconceal itself through a free dis-
position with the open, being must fight the oblivion consummated by Western metaphysics 
against Being. It is only by reconstituting itself in the presence of Being that being, according to 
Heidegger, and after him Agamben, may regain a fuller and more original place in the open. And it 
is from this place, as Agamben argues in L'aperto that a new ethics and politics may commence. 
L'aperto, as many other books by Agamben, must be seen as one in a long series of approaches to 
what might be considered the original place. It does not describe so much the place as the stages 
which might be needed in order to reach it. One of these stages is the destruction of experience 
(the project of Infanzia e storia), another one is the suspension of being (the purpose of L'aperto). 
Agamben conceptualizes "l'aperto" by following closely Heidegger's definition of the open as the 
name of Being and of the world. From Heidegger, he also takes the main distinction between ani-
mals (those which are unaware of the open) and humans (those who face the open), as well as the 
theory of a possible proximity and similarity between humans and animals. It is the latter theory 
that enables Agamben to carry Heidegger's thought further. In Parmenides, Heidegger compares 
humans' boredom with the stupefied being of the animal in the open. But whereas stupefaction 
conceals the world to the animal, boredom, especially if and when understood in the meaning of 
suspension, has the potential to bring humans into the presence of the world and of Being. 
Through suspending all the actual possibilities open to being by life, the original potentiality of 
simply Being might emerge. It is at moments of utter boredom and suspension, when ordinary life, 
and all its countless activities, is emptied and void that being might find itself available to the pos-
sibility of Being; in other words, to that possibility before and beyond metaphysics, and before and 
beyond the politics and ethics of metaphysics. The difference between Heidegger and Agamben is 
that for the latter these moments of suspension are precisely the moments when humans and an-
imals become suspended in indistinction, and when animality and humanity are momentarily rec-
onciled. These are the moments at which the anthropological machine (la macchina antropologica) 
comes to a halt. Agamben's interpretation of Heidegger's thought can be defined -- using termi-
nology borrowed from Gianni Vattimo -- as an interpretation from the left. In Oltre 
l'interpretazione, Vattimo argues that there are two main approaches to Heidegger's thought: one 
is the approach from the right which insists on reading Heidegger's work as leading to the recovery 
of the essence (Being), the other is the approach from the left which understands his philosophy 
as the suspension of the essence through what Vattimo calls, rather beautifully, the remembrance 
of the oblivion ("ricordare l'oblio" 18). Remembering to forget the possibilities of being appears, in 
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fact, the premises on which Agamben constructs not only his reading of Heidegger, but also his 
philosophical project. However, in L'aperto oblivion and suspension are not the necessary passages 
towards recuperating the essence of Being, but the very sites of thinking and ontology. 
An exquisite and elegant book by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Echolalias: On the forgetting of Lan-
guage (2005), helps negotiate notions such as oblivion and suspension, contributing original 
thoughts which superbly integrate and supplement Agamben's project (it should be noted that Hel-
ler-Roazen is the translator into English of a series of significant essays by Agamben published in 
1999 by Stanford UP with the title of Potentialities; many of the essays in the volume tackle rather 
directly the notion of suspension and the impact that suspension might have in the conceptualiza-
tion of the potentialities of being). Echolalias is divided into twenty-one chapters, some of which 
are little more than long aphorisms on language and its relation to being/s. They can be read in-
dependently or as parts of an intriguingly woven whole, whose pattern and physiognomy will not 
be missed by the careful reader. However, it is in Chapters XIII and XIV ("The Writing Cow" and 
"The Lesser Animal") that Heller-Roazen comes interestingly and significantly close to Agamben's 
project in L'aperto. In "The Writing Cow" he relates the transformation of Io, the daughter of the 
river god Inachus, as narrated by Ovid in the Metamorphoses. The metamorphosis from human 
into animal takes place when Jupiter's fancy for Io is about to be discovered by the jealous Juno. 
Jupiter has no option but to turn the unfortunate nymph into a cow: "Coniugis adventum" writes 
Ovid, "praesenserat inque nitentem/Inachidos vultus mutaverat ille iuvencam./ Bos quoque formo-
sa est" (38) ("Anticipating the arrival of his wife, Jupiter had transformed Inachus's daughter into 
an exceedingly beautiful cow"; my translation). L'aperto opens with the description of a series of 
illuminations accompanying a Hebrew bible of the thirteenth century. Agamben tells us that the 
Bible scene of "the messianic banquet of the righteous" (1) ("il banchetto messianico dei giusti" 
[9]) can be admired. Shadowed by heavenly trees and entertained by divine music, the righteous 
sit at a richly adorned table. Everything conforms to the norm apart from the fact that the right-
eous have heads of animals (an eagle, an ox, an ass, a panther, a monkey). As a preliminary in-
terpretation of such a surprising scene, Agamben states that the implied meaning might be that on 
judgement day the relation between animals and humans will be recomposed in a new form, and 
that humans will be reconciled with their animal nature: "on the last day, the relations between 
animals and men will take on a new form, and that man himself will be reconciled with his animal 
nature" (3) ("nell'ultimo giorno, i rapporti fra gli animali e gli uomini si comporranno in una nuova 
forma e l'uomo stesso si riconcilierà con la sua natura animale" [11]). The difference between the 
transformation/recomposition Agamben describes, and the transformation of Io retold by Heller-
Roazen is that the former is partial while the latter is total. Or at least this seems to be the case. 
And yet, as Heller-Roazen reminds us, Io will make her former human identity known to her father 
by writing her name, "Io" on the sand with the hoof: "For if the transformation," writes Heller-
Roazen, "is to be perceptible as such, something must indicate that it has taken place, something 
in the new form must mark the occurrence of the change. Precisely for the metamorphosis to be 
without residue, it must paradoxically admit a reminder that bears witness to the event of the mu-
tation: an element both foreign to the new body and still contained within it, an exceptional trait in 
the body 'strange' that harks back to the earlier shape it once possessed" (124). In other words, 
the metamorphosis must retain its negation within itself, or better still, it must retain its suspen-
sion in order to be apparent and meaningful. It is only by suspending its being and by positioning 
it on the threshold between animal and human that Io can achieve an entirely new and meaningful 
form. And so do the righteous at the messianic banquet in the Hebrew Bible.  
In the chapter "The Lesser Animal," the relation between humans and animals is taken up 
again by Heller-Roazen via Spinoza's Ethics and, most importantly and decisively, via The Book of 
Living Things, a canonical text of Arab literature written "towards the middle of the eighth century 
A.D." (129). From Ethics Hellen-Roazen extracts the sentence "There is much to be seen in ani-
mal," which he then compares with the unequivocal celebration of the animal world in The Book of 
Living Things, where admiration for the skills and achievements of animals surpasses those of hu-
mans. "Each of them [animals]," Heller-Roazen quotes from The Book of Living Things, "knows 
how to accomplish certain actions that even the most skilful of men, carrying out feats of excel-
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lence, cannot equal" (131). The main difference between animals and humans noted by the Arab 
author is that animals are always compelled to do exactly the same, whereas humans have the 
"ability" to carry out "easier actions" (131). While birds "sing with unfailing melodic and metrical 
exactitude" and "cannot do otherwise," humans can "always also sing an easier, simpler, and less-
er one" (131-32). The praises for the animal world that Heller-Roazen finds in the eighth-century 
Arab book are remarkably similar to what Agamben finds in Linnaeus (see 23-27; 30-34), and 
connect rather instructively with Agamben's discussion of the work of Ernst Haeckel (author of Die 
Weltträtsel) and Jakob von Uexküll. The main thesis underpinning Agamben's work, and implicitly 
but overtly underscoring Heller-Roazen's discussion, is that if there is really a difference between 
the animal world and the human world, this must be found in and through the category of potenti-
ality. People can choose to do things differently or not at all. It is precisely this ability to suspend 
life in potentiality that brings humans face-to-face with the world, and also with their animal na-
ture (on Agamben and potentiality, see, e.g., Bartoloni 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol5/iss1/2>). Kafka related this ability to memory. In a won-
derful aphorism quoted by Heller-Roazen, Kafka stated that: "I can swim just like the others. Only 
I have a better memory than the others. I have not forgotten the former inability to swim ... But 
since I have not forgotten it, being able to swim is of no help to me; and so, after all, I cannot 
swim" (146). It is an excess of memory that brings Kafka to the brink of an ontological realization 
and understanding that perhaps found articulation in his novels and short stories. What Kafka 
sensed, and actually captured for a moment, is precisely the taking place of that event in which 
humans catch their essence by suspending their "humanity." It is by forcing the remembrance of 
what he really is (a creature that can do less) that Kafka at once comes close to the animal (the 
reversal to the world of nature before acculturation) and departs from it through the contemplation 
of his pure potentiality. The significant question that Heller-Roazen asks in his wonderfully crafted 
and learned book is also the great ontological problem confronting humanity today: would we find 
us by forgetting our humanity and becoming, like animals, those magnificent beasts that can do 
only wondrous feats by reifying the same; or would we find it by pausing and remembering that 
we can also do less, that we can also do otherwise? Similarly, in L'aperto Agamben proposes a 
radical review of the anthropological machine not so much to invite a naïve return to nature, in-
voking a generic embrace of the animal in us, as to draw attention to a new modality of being that 
must pass through the suspension of being, which is also the result of a new understanding of the 
relation between animals and humans. 
One of the most compelling articulations and discussions of suspension is found in the work of 
Maurice Blanchot. Both Blanchot's more specifically theoretical writing (especially L'Espace 
littéraire, La Communauté inavouable, L'Ecriture du désastre, and La Part du feu) and his fiction 
(especially L'Attente, l'oublie) think and narrate with rare consistency a form of writing and being 
predicated upon what, in La Part du feu, Blanchot calls "l'existence sans l'être" (334). In her book 
What Is There to Say? Blanchot, Melville, des Forêts, Beckett (2003), Ann Smock treats this no-
tion, and its attendant literary and philosophical implications as the central issue criss-crossing 
Blanchot's opus. In fact, it is precisely suspension, potentiality, and waiting that enable Smock to 
construct an interesting and original comparative analysis of the four authors under investigation. 
And yet, of the four Blanchot and Melville appear to attract a special attention, and also the largest 
share of Smock's study, which to my view is understandable and not without significance. Chapter 
One of What Is There to Say? sets the tone of what follows with extreme clarity. On page 6 we 
read: "I'll keep stressing the resemblance between speech and waiting as this book proceeds, 
thinking of waiting's unsettled mix of passivity and impatience, and of sentences such as the fol-
lowing, from L'Attente l'oubli: "Waiting is always a wait for waiting, wherein the beginning is with-
held, and the end suspended, and the interval of another wait thus opened." Or: "The impossibility 
of waiting belongs essentially to waiting." And on page 9: "a relation of indifference instead of uni-
ty or sameness: indistinction thwarting union, in fact. The 'one thing' interrupting and suspending 
the one, deferring it." But it is on page 13 that Smock's reading of Blanchot reaches a bold explic-
itness, which is both symptomatic of her methodological approach, and instructively consonant to 
our discussion of Agamben's and Heller-Roazen's writing. Smock writes that a "fundamental preoc-
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cupation" of Blanchot can be found in "the thought of lifeless beings exiled from death, unable to 
end. For language has, in liquidating them, given being to their lack and to their absence an un-
graspable but inescapable presence" (13). To which Smock adds two more conceptual clarifications 
followed by a quotation from L'Espace littéraire: "In order for there to be a world at all such as the 
one men inform with value and meaning and in which they undertake their history, beings must 
lack" (13); "It's on the basis of a lack of being that man, properly speaking, begins; it's in man 
that not to be is a fundamental mode of possibility" (13); "And this beginning rules that, in order 
for there to be a world, in order for there to be beings, being must lack" (13). Blanchot's under-
standing of lack must be understood not so much as a spiritual or transcendental concept as a 
precise ontological event, whose main feature is that of not to be. But this not to be, as we have 
seen when discussing Agamben and Heller-Roazen, is nothing other that the taking place of a pro-
ductive suspension and a deliberate halting of being in which, through arresting the actual possibil-
ities of being, being faces its essential potentiality and its openness.  
There could be no better example of this event than Melville's character "Bartleby," the famous 
scrivener who politely and most courteously declines to carry out any chores. He just sits at his 
desk and observes, unproductive and désœuvré. It is essential in this context to remember that in 
1980 Blanchot published L'Ecriture du désastre, in which, among other things, he offered an in-
tense and original reading of Melville's "Bartleby" as an example of his project of insubordination, 
whose purpose was rather similar to that of Agamben's, that is, to interrupt the "anthropological 
machine." In Blanchot's own words, Bartleby's abdication of action, his insubordination, decrees a 
stop, "a suspension. In that suspension, society falls apart completely. The law collapses: for an 
instant there is innocence; history is interrupted" (Blanchot in Holland 205). Agamben himself has 
written an important essay, "Bartleby, or On Contingency" (in Potentialities, 1999), on Bartleby's 
will to inhabit potentiality as such, the potentiality that resists the assimilation into action. Further, 
when discussing Titian's painting Nymph and Shepherd in L'aperto as an example of a supreme life 
event, Agamben takes up again Blanchot's theme of désœuvrement. He claims that: "In their ful-
filment, the lovers who have lost their mystery contemplate a human nature rendered perfectly 
inoperative – the inactivity and désœuvrement of the human and of the animal as the supreme 
and unsavable figure of life" (87) ("Nell'appagamento, gli amanti, che hanno perduto il loro 
mistero, contemplano una natura umana resa perfettamente inoperosa -- l'inoperosità e il 
désœuvrement dell'umano e dell'animale come figura suprema e insalvabile della vita" [90]). 
Smock is aware of these conceptual connections and articulates her whole argument by bringing to 
light the considerable significance of these philosophical and literary concerns, which are at the 
centre of Western modernism. In Blanchot's eyes suspension, which he also called "waiting," "the 
neuter," is also the beginning of productive creativity, and correlates with, is in fact complemented 
by a sense of astonishment in the face of what is taking place, and in the language that gives tan-
gibility to production. In What is Philosophy? Heidegger defines astonishment thus: "In astonish-
ment we restrain ourselves. We step back, as it were, from being, from the fact that it is as it is 
and not otherwise" (85). It is at once philosophically significant and poetic that Heidegger chose to 
define astonishment as an act of self-restraint where, and here lies the beauty and the importance 
of this statement: restraint is the active resistance to accept that which is pre-arranged and pre-
ordained, pre-packaged, arbitrarily complete. Instead, Heidegger invites us to break this artificial, 
un-philosophical and un-poetic reading of life, to "destroy" it (in the sense that destruction means 
in Heidegger) in order to pave the way, the path, to seeing it and to saying it "otherwise." It is in 
this sense that "suspension," as I have articulated so far discussing Agamben's, Heller-Roazen's, 
and Smock's texts, must be understood. Therefore, suspension is not an idle temporality devoid of 
energeia (intended here in the Aristotelian sense of "actuality"), but rather the opposite, that is the 
will to suspend our unproblematic acceptance of life, indeed to destroy it. If for Blanchot suspen-
sion was the necessary beginning of literature and life, for Agamben suspension is the unavoidable 
step to take in order to enter a new ontology of being. L'aperto, Echolalias, and What Is There to 
Say? are three books that meet at the significant literary and philosophical junction of suspension 
and potentiality, and provide lucid and illuminating tools to negotiate a concept, an event, and a 
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mode that, despite its history in the tradition of Western philosophy, remains elusive and underde-
veloped. 
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